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Abstract 
This paper examines the role that official development assistance (ODA) plays in achieving 
human development outcomes in the presence of good policy environments. Using data 
from 96 low and middle-income countries for the period 1996-2014, the paper develops 
and tests static and dynamic panel data models controlling for potential endogeneity of aid 
and human development. In exploring the impacts of aid, indicators of economic, political 
and institutional governance were taken into account. With moderate differences across 
countries, results suggest that foreign aid is positively and significantly linked with, and 
hence facilitates, human development indicators. Also, the governance indicators influence 
human development. So, providing more aid is justified if better economic, political and 
institutional governance in the recipient countries can be ensured. 
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Aid and Human Development: Is There A Role for Good Policy Environment? 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed a continuous debate on aid effectiveness, but no concrete 
resolution. While many cross-country studies find that foreign aid positively and robustly affects 
economic growth on average, others disagree (Gopalan and Rajan, 2016; Clemens et al., 2011). 
Many, yet again, claim that aid-financed facilities have favourably influenced people’s lives by 
providing access to education, health care services, safe drinking water and sanitation. But others 
contend that foreign aid has only helped political leaders of the recipient countries to accumulate 
huge personal prosperities eventually leaving no trace of development (World Bank, 1998). In this 
context, some authors argue that countries with good policies or governance may enjoy some 
positive effects of aid (e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Debates on aid effectiveness apart, 
however, objectives of foreign aid announced by the donor community have been greatly changed 
in recent times (Shah, 2014). Foreign aid was primarily advocated for intensive industrialization in 
the 1950s (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). But, nowadays poverty reduction has become the main 
objective of aid to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Akiyama, 2006)1. For 
instance, the main objective of OECD’s official development assistance (ODA) is to promote 
welfare and economic development of developing countries (OECD, 2016). Also the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had emphasized that human development should be 
the core objective of foreign aid (Williamson, 2008).  
 
Aid effectiveness is commonly evaluated through the lens of the much-debated aid-growth nexus. 
A related question thus emanates: does growth in GDP mean everything to ensure human 
development? Well, perhaps not. In “Development as Freedom”, Sen (1999) explains how 
development can be viewed as a process of expanding human freedoms and how growth of gross 
or individual incomes—though highly important for people’s freedom—provides only a narrower 
view on development. Thus, development clearly expands beyond just growth in GDP (Sen, 1999). 
Evidently, higher GDP growth may not reduce high poverty in many developing countries (Fosu, 
2011). Also, “merit goods” (such as, basic health services, education, nutrition supports, 
vaccinations etc.) are fundamental to the development process and people are interested in the 
contribution of aid to “merit goods” (Arndt et al., 2015). Access to these goods are the micro-level 
impacts of aid that help us look beyond just economic growth and into the qualitative, non-
monetary and welfare aspects of development.  
 
Nonetheless, can aid really affect human development or the social welfare outcomes? Well, at 
least theoretically, foreign aid is to bridge the savings-investment gap in the recipient countries 
(Chenery and Strout, 1966; Harrington, 2003) and effective aid contributes to poverty reduction 
(Collier and Dollar, 2001). As foreign aid provides supports for public financial efforts as well, it 
is a source of public capital (Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2005). However, provision of aid is highly 
volatile (Hudson, 2015; Pallage and Robe, 2001). So, higher aid-dependence could make delivery 
of public services more volatile increasing the vulnerability of the poor. Consequently, by 
increasing inequality, aid could worsen social development as well. All in all, there is room for 
 
1 Akiyama (2006) had mentioned about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). But, as the MDGs 
have now been subsumed under the SDGs (Gopalan and Rajan, 2016) MDGs is replaced by SDGs. 
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more theoretical arguments on the effect of aid on social outcomes. As a result, the political 
economy of foreign aid has been a widely debated topic in policy-making and academic circles 
(Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016). Hence, as aid is currently more promoted for human 
development, researchers are now growingly interested in the development effects of aid in recent 
times (Williamson, 2008; Masud and Yontcheva, 2005).   
 
There is a micro-macro paradox regarding the impact of aid on development in the literature. While 
targeted aid interventions have positive impacts at the micro level, such impacts are not very 
obvious at the macro level (Seguino, 2008; Clemens et al., 2011; Pickbourn, and Ndikumana, 2013). 
Micro-level studies use different health and education indicators—such as infant mortality rate, 
life expectancy, death rate, primary school enrolments and human development index (HDI)—as 
the proxies for human development, but the results of these studies are rather mixed. For example, 
Mishra and Newhouse (2009) claim that health aid is indeed beneficial and helps to lower infant 
mortality in recipient countries. This is, however, not in line with Boone (1996) as he found no 
evidence that aid reduces infant mortality. Nevertheless, several studies have supported the view 
that aid could help social development. For example, Michaelowa and Weber (2006) and Dreher, 
Nunnnenkamp, and Thiele (2008) find evidence that aid contributes to increasing primary school 
enrolments. Gormanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005b) find that aid is associated with 
improvements in the overall HDI. Studies of Riddel and Nino-Zarazua (2016) and Pickbourn, and 
Ndikumana (2013) find that aid could ensure better access to health, education services and gender 
equity depending on the initial levels of human development and per capita income. Again, the 
studies of Gopalan and Rajan (2016) and Botting et al. (2010) find that aid helps to improve access 
to water and sanitation facilities. In this context, good governance is highly important as well. As 
mentioned before, Burnside and Dollar (2000) noted that countries with good policies or 
governance may enjoy some positive effects of aid. However, only a few studies (e.g., Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2016; Gopalan and Rajan, 2016; Pickbourn and Ndikumana, 2013; Okada and 
Samreth, 2012; Williamson, 2008 and Masud and Yontcheva, 2005) have incorporated policy and 
governance issues in the analyses. To the best of my knowledge, however, studies that examine 
the impact of ODA on human development in the presence of good policy environment is rare.  
 
Hence, there are scopes for new investigations to assess the human development impacts of 
foreign aid at the micro-level, over and above its effect on GDP growth, taking policy and 
governance issues into account. This study, therefore, aims to meet the research gap by 
investigating if aid, supported by country-level good policy environments, can favourably affect 
human development. The study uses a set of health indicators (i.e., a set of ‘flash’ indicators) as 
the proxies for human development2. However, if aid is dependent on some social indicators, then 
it might not be exogenous with respect to the human development. Therefore, to tackle the 
endogeneity problems in a dynamic setting, the paper employs the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) data from 96 low 
and middle-income countries for the period 1996-20143. Results suggest that development aid is 
positively and significantly linked with, and hence facilitates, human development as expected. So, 
the study supports the view that foreign aid help improve human development scenarios of 
 
2 Boone (1996) mentioned about these ‘flash’ indicators of human development. 
3 WGI are basically the contribution of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). 
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recipient countries and the development community should therefore push for providing more 
foreign aid. In this way, aid can be viewed as a powerful instrument for human development. The 
study also finds that human development is significantly affected by income (measured by GDP 
per capita), urbanization, population growth and trade openness. With clear regional differences, 
quality of governance is also found to be important in this study. Results in this study are robust 
to different model specifications, estimations methods and data sets. 
 
By providing new insights, thus the study will deliver the next step to the existing debate and 
contribute to the literature in at least four ways. First, the study addresses a relatively new research 
question: what is the impact of ODA on human development indicators in the presence of good 
policy environment? Although previous studies aimed to address related issues, we extend the 
analyses to a great extent by adding several years of more recent data, by using different human 
development proxies and by applying more sophisticate econometric techniques. For instance, 
Gopalan and Rajan (2016), Pickbourn and Ndikumana (2013), Williamson (2008) and Masud and 
Yontcheva (2005) are four related studies in this area. This study differs from the study of Gopalan 
and Rajan (2016) in that they used access to safe water and sanitation as the proxies for human 
development using the OECD-DAC data. The study departs from Pickbourn and Ndikumana 
(2013) in that they used HDIs as the outcome variables and the OECD-DAC as the data source4. 
This study differs from the study of Williamson (2008) in that she used sector-specific health aid 
as the aid variable and the data sources were different. This study differs from the study of Masud 
and Yontcheva (2005) in that their study is limited only to the European NGOs and they utilized 
NGO aid and bilateral aid data collected from the European Commission. So, although the 
dependent variables used in this study are similar to those used in Williamson (2008) and Masud 
and Yontcheva (2005), they are dissimilar to those used in Gopalan and Rajan (2016) and 
Pickbourn and Ndikumana (2013). Also the data used in this study cover recent years and were 
collected from the World Bank sources which is different from the above four studies. Second, 
following previous studies, the study employs the system-GMM dynamic panel data (DPD) models 
to take care of potential endogeneity in the dynamic sense. Third, numerous aid-effectiveness 
studies concentrate on the links between aid, macroeconomic growth and policy, but very little 
have been done on the area of aid, human development and policy. This study aims to contribute 
in that area. Fourth, following previous studies, this cross-country study also provides regional 
analyses of the impacts of development aid.  
 
The paper consists of four further sections as follows. The next section provides a review of the 
relevant literature primarily on the linkages between foreign aid and human development. Section 
3 describes the data and presents the econometric estimation methodology. Section 4 discusses 
the results and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature 
Foreign aid takes many forms—such as, ODA, humanitarian aid, food aid and military assistance. 
Consequently, a voluminous academic literature on the effectiveness of various types of aid has 
 
4 HDI is the weighted average of five indicators representing population health, education, and standard 
of living that contains already the GDP per capita (Nourou, 2014). This study, however, aims to analyze 
the effect of aid after controlling for GDP per capita separately.  
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developed over several decades5. Research evidence on aid effectiveness is generally diverse. A 
number of studies suggest that foreign aid (not necessarily, ODA) effectively stimulates economic 
growth depending on country-level policies and institutional settings (see, for instance, Asongu 
and Jellal, 2013; Clemens et al., 2011; Okada and Samreth, 2012; Minou and Reddy, 2010; Fielding, 
McGillivray and Torres, 2006; Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray, 2005; Mosley, Hudson and 
Verschoor, 2004; Gomane et al., 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Feeny, 2003; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 
2001; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000). Another stream of literature essentially suggest that aid has merely failed to 
contribute to the economic growth in recipient countries (see, for instance, Asongu, 2014; Moyo, 
2009; Collier, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2007; Easterly 2006; Rajan and Subramanian 2005; 
Mosley et al., 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Boone, 1996; Pedersen, 1996; Reichel, 1995). Again, 
the effectiveness of ODA is the subject of heated debate (Edwards, 2014) which is largely centred 
on the micro-level and macro-level impacts of foreign aid. As mentioned earlier, this literature 
reveals a clear micro-macro paradox since while targeted aid has some positive micro-level impacts, 
such impact at the macro-level is not very clear. In this study, I have mainly attempted to 
concentrate on the literature that explores the aid-human development nexus. In other words, the 
literature that concentrates on the micro-level impacts of foreign aid is the main area of my interest. 
Many studies provide detailed and recent literature reviews on aid, institutions, governance and 
development (see, for example, Gopalan and Rajan, 2016; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Arndt 
et al., 2015 and Pickbourn and Ndikumana, 2013).  
 
At the macro-level, Howes (2011) provides a convenient typology of the aid effectiveness literature 
in two major dimensions: “good and bad” and “large and small”. This distinction, again, gives four 
different views: ‘‘good and large”, ‘‘bad and large”, ‘‘good and small” and ‘‘bad and small” (Howes, 
2011; Gopalan and Rajan, 2016). The first group of authors (e.g., Sachs, 2005) claim that aid may 
produce ‘‘good and large” effects if delivered appropriately and in sufficiently large amounts. The 
second group of authors (e.g., Bauer and Yamey, 1982 and Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle, 
2008) argue that aid can have a large impact, but in a negative rather than positive direction. The 
third group finds that aid’s role in determining economic development is minor, but the impacts 
are positive (e.g., Rodrik, Birdsall and Subramaniam, 2005).  The fourth group argues that largely 
aid is but a minor and negative determinant of economic development (e.g., Easterly, 2006, p. 157).  
 
Several micro-level analyses focus on whether aid interventions have been effective for human 
development. For instance, Gopalan and Rajan (2016) concentrates on the impact of foreign aid 
on improved access to Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) and finds that such effects are strong 
and positive in the WSS sector. Pickbourn, and Ndikumana (2013) examine foreign aid’s role in 
generating human development goals such as education, health, gender equity, nutrition and access 
to safe water and better sanitation. They find that many of these outcomes depend on initial human 
development level and income per capita. Asiama and Quartey (2009) focuses exclusively on 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and investigates the impact of foreign aid on the HDIs. 
Their results suggest that aggregate bilateral aid does not show a significant effect on the HDIs 
and other welfare variables. While sector and programme specific aid positively impacts on the 
 
5 Recent studies of Edwards (2014), Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016) and Gopalan and Rajan (2016), for 
instance, provide interesting reviews. 
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HDIs, but not other welfare variables (e.g., infant mortality rates). Mishra and Newhouse (2009) 
find that aid helps to lower infant mortality rates in recipient countries, while Dreher et al. (2008) 
find evidence that aid may contribute to increasing primary school enrolment. Using health aid 
data from both developed and developing countries, among others, Williamson (2008) examined 
whether institutional environment to aid affects human development and finds aid as an ineffective 
human development tool. McGillivray and Noorbakhsh (2007) find that aid alone has a negative 
impact on HDI scores but disagree with Kosack (2003) in that they do not find a negative effect 
of democracy on the HDI. Gormanee et al. (2005a) also find that aid is associated with 
improvements in the Human Development Index. Gomanee et al. (2005b) also find that aid has a 
direct impact on human development, but little evidence of an indirect effect via pro-poor 
expenditure (PPE) index. Among others, using both bilateral aid and NGO aid data, Masud and 
Yontcheva (2005) show that NGO aid reduces infant mortality better than official bilateral aid. 
However, as they find, aid’s impact on illiteracy is less significant. According to Ndikumana (2012), 
however, these positive impacts of aid at the micro level may not always reflect visible macro-level 
positive results owing to a variety of structural problems. Due to this dichotomy between the 
micro-level and macro-level effectiveness of aid, the impact of aid on economic development 
becomes unclear (Pickbourn and Ndikumana, 2013).  
 
On top of measuring aid effectiveness in terms of growth outcomes, several macro-level analyses 
basically explore the links between foreign aid and other macroeconomic performance 
indicators—such as democracy, policy, governance, conflicts and so on. For instance, while Collier 
and Dollar (2002) explores the effects of aid on GDP growth to see which mode of allocation of 
aid is more efficient in reducing poverty, Kosack (2003) finds aid effectiveness to be greatly 
dependent on whether the country is democratic or autocratic. They find that aid positively affects 
human development but only in democracies. In autocracies, however, such effects are negative. 
Though, democracy by itself is also an aspect of social development. Hansen and Headey (2010) 
examine the short-run macro effects of aid by splitting the countries in their sample into those that 
are highly dependent on ODA and those that are not. They find that there is some critical level of 
aid dependence under which aid cannot be effective and that being overly dependent on aid results 
in macro distortions or poor governance. Again, Azam and Thelen (2008) show that the level of 
foreign aid received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries. However, this is 
just one aspect of human development as reducing terrorist attacks may not be enough to 
significantly improve peoples’ well-being. 
 
Also, policy and governance are important macro-level issues in the aid effectiveness literature and 
many authors have analysed how governance, policies, public sector investments and conflicts may 
affect aid effectiveness. As mentioned before, Burnside and Dollar (2000) noted that countries 
with good policies or governance may enjoy some positive effects of aid. Busse and Gröning (2009) 
finds that aid has an adverse impact on governance. Collier and Dehn (2001) include export price 
shocks into their analysis and find that growth is reduced in extreme negative shocks. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post-conflict societies. Dalgaard and 
Hansen (2001) re-explores the growth regressions in Burnside and Dollar (2000) and support their 
views. Easterly (2003) examines whether foreign aid really ensure economic growth. McGillivray 
(2000) finds that aid positively affects both investment and consumption expenditure, but it has 
no final impact on taxation. 
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Thus we see that the aid effectiveness literature is spread over a number of themes that examines 
different types of nexuses. Also, research interests in many areas are just growing. However, the 
research literature provides conflicting results. While one stream of literature shows that foreign 
aid can improve social development, another stream claims the opposite: foreign aid can also 
worsen social and human development. These disputes can only be dissolved through conducting 
fresh empirical studies as we really need to know more about how aid affects human development 
at the micro-level. Besides, it is widely acknowledged that human development is not only a goal 
of foreign aid, but it is also an important contributor to sustainable and equitable economic growth. 
Thus, a micro-level analysis of the impact of development aid on human development is not only 
timely but highly essential. This justifies the need of another study on this topic.  
 
3. Empirical methodology and data 
3.1 Baseline model  
The empirical model of the effect of ODA on human development is based on reduced form 
speciﬁcations for a set of human development indicators. The main variable of interest is ODA. 
In the literature, several ‘flash’ indicators of human development—for example, infant mortality 
rate, female illiteracy rate, adult life expectancy, death rate, maternal mortality rate and child 
immunizations—have been used to capture the overall quality of human development in a country 
(see, for instance, Boone, 1996). To answer the question of whether foreign aid help improve 
human development in the presence of good policy environments, therefore, we estimate the 
following specification of human development regression: 
 
Yi,t = α + βAidi,t + δ´Zi,t + γ´Vi,t + ui + εi,t  (1) 
where Yi,t represents the measures of human development of country i at time t; Aidi,t is the main 
variable of our interest, which is proxied by ODA as percent of GNI of country i at time t; Z is a 
vector of control variables; V is a vector of interaction variables generated through the interactions 
between the aid variable and the quality of governance measures; β is the vector of coefficients on 
Aid,  δ is the vector of coefficients on the control variables (Z) and γ is the vector of coefficients 
on the interaction variables (V); ui is the country-level effect; ɛi,t is the usual (idiosyncratic) error 
term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the vector columns (Aid, Z, V and u). β, the 
parameter of interest, represents the coefficient of the gross ODA disbursements directed at the 
human development measures. To address the question of our interest in this panel data setting 
we need to control for country-specific factors that may potentially confound our results. Fixed 
effects (FE) models that include the country fixed effects in the model are generally estimated in 
these cases. So, as the baseline first FE models were estimated.  
 
3.2 Endogeneity concerns 
However, static FE estimations might deliver misleading inferences, particularly in the ‘small T, 
large N’ data context. Because, the demeaning process of the variables in FE estimations might 
create a correlation between the regressors and error terms which is known as ‘dynamic panel bias’ 
or the ‘Nickell bias’ (Roodman, 2009). Also, as Mcgillivray and Noorbakhsh (2007) note, following 
endogeneity related econometric concerns are important as well. For aid disbursements, donors 
might prefer countries with lower real GDP growth rates or HDIs. There may be some time lags 
between disbursement and execution also as donors normally decide to allocate aid before growth 
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rates or HDI levels of countries are determined. Again, improved levels of education, health and 
incomes contribute greatly to a country’s ability to disburse aid. Contrariwise, countries with low 
HDIs may have higher incentives for disbursing aid allocations and donors may prefer to assist 
these countries’ aid disbursements. Similarly, it is difficult to determine whether aid affects, or is 
affected by, government efforts. Thus, aid might not be exogenous relating to the human 
development indicators chosen in this study. Taking care of potential simultaneity bias is very 
important too, since the measure of foreign aid itself can be potentially endogenous. Therefore, to 
check for potential endogeneity, first the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was applied. This test may 
also be employed to a subset of endogenous variables. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates 
the existence of endogeneity. Hence, we need to break potential endogeneity and simultaneity 
problems by choosing an appropriate instrumental variables estimation technique. 
 
3.3 Dynamic model   
Yet again, static FE estimations might deliver misleading inferences since aid effectiveness by itself 
can be dynamic in nature. It is possible that human development might be characterized by 
informational opacity and persistence. That is, level of human development in the previous year 
may affect the same in the next year. So, we should include a lagged component of the outcome 
variable (human development) in the right-hand side of the model we estimate. But, FE models 
with a lagged dependent variable can be inconsistent and biased in small T panels (Wooldridge, 
2010, pp. 371–374) and may result in overinflated estimates of a treatment effect (Nickell, 1981; 
Gibson et al., 2015).  
 
To deal with the endogeneity problems and handle the dynamic nature of the relationship between 
aid and human development, therefore, a dynamic panel data (DPD) model is more justified to 
use. An application of DPD can also guarantee the robustness of the static estimates. Taking care 
of the endogeneity and dynamism of the context as well as controlling for other country-specific 
characteristics, a DPD model in this context properly measures the effectiveness of ODA flows 
directed at human development. Thus, based on reduced form speciﬁcations for a set of indicators 
of human and social development, I estimate the following dynamic version of human 
development regression: 
 
Yi,t = α + β0Yi,(t-1) + β1Aidi,t + δ´Zi,t + γ´Vi,t + ui + εi,t   (2) 
 
Where, Yi, (t-1) is the human development measures lagged by one year included to account for the 
persistence of the dependent variable. Explanations on other terms included in the model are 
similar to those given for the terms in equation (1).  
 
As a better estimation strategy, following Gopalan and Rajan (2016) and Hansen and Tarp (2001), 
the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator (the so-called ‘system GMM’) is employed 
to estimate this model6. By treating the explanatory variables as exogenous, predetermined, or 
 
6 This is the augmented version of Arellano and Bond (1991) outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
fully developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Arelano and Bond’s (1991) dynamic panel estimation uses 
lagged levels of first difference of variables as instruments. However, as pointed out by Arellano and 
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endogenous, this GMM estimator removes the fixed effects using first differences and uses 
appropriate time lags to instrument for the lagged dependent variable. Besides accounting for the 
specified dynamics, this estimator accommodates the possible endogeneity between human 
development indicators and some of the independent variables by means of appropriate 
instruments. The Sargan test and the Hansen test results have been used to select instruments so 
that the estimated equations are not over-identified (acceptable over-identifying restrictions begin 
at the 5% level of statistical significance). In some cases, Hansen test statistics were chosen (where 
Sargan is rejecting and Hansen is failing to reject) as Hansen is more robust than Sargan. For 
example, Sargan is not distributed as χ2 under heteroskedasticity, whereas Hansen is, and if this 
problem is present then it could cause Sargan to incorrectly reject the null. To take care of the 
likely problem of serial correlation of the error term, estimations are carried out using standard 
errors corrected by the method from Windmeijer (2005), which provides robust standard errors.  
 
I additionally introduce the following static version of the model mainly to check the robustness 
of the results. 
Yi,t = α + β1Aidi,t + β2´Zi,t + β3´Vi,t + ui + εi,t  (3) 
 
Where explanations on the variables are similar to those given for equation (1). Since the 
explanatory variables encounter the problem of possible endogeneity, use of an instrumental 
variable estimator is suggested. So, a conventional panel instrumental variable estimation is 
employed to address potential endogeneity of regressors. We run the ‘fixed effects two stage least 
squares’ FE2SLS estimators with and without GMM options. Since the FE2SLS yields a consistent 
estimator, consequently, we choose to report the FE2SLS estimates only. 
 
3.4 Outcome variables 
Boone (1996) suggests several ‘flash’ indicators of human development. To capture the overall 
quality of human development in a country, among them, the ‘flash’ indicators of human 
development included in the study are infant mortality, life expectancy at birth and death rate. 
Infant mortality (per 1000 of births) is the number of infants dying before one year of age in a 
given year. This number should decrease as foreign aid flows to the health sector increase. Life 
expectancy at the time of birth, reported in years, is another variable we would expect foreign aid 
to affect, raising the expectancy of one's life. The death rate, estimated per 1000 of the population 
at midyear, is a crude measure that estimates the number of deaths occurring during the period. If 
ODA is effective on human development, it should have a negative effect on the death rate. That 
is, as more ODA flows, the death rate should fall.  
 
 
 
 
Bover (1995), lagged levels tend to be poor instruments for first differences. Hence, to mitigate this 
problem they recommend the use of a ‘‘system GMM” estimator. This augmented version uses lagged 
levels of the series as instruments for the endogenous variables in the equations in first differences and 
lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments for equations in levels. A test of serial 
correlations for the error terms of the differenced equation is also used to check the validity of the 
instruments. 
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3.5 Control variables 
A selected set of macroeconomic, demographic, and quality of governance variables affecting 
social and human development are employed as controls in the model. Use of these variables are 
largely common in the general aid-growth literature noted above and fall under three categories. 
The first set are standard macroeconomic policy variables capturing gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, GDP growth rate and trade openness. The second set are the demographic 
variables such as population growth rate and percent of urban population (a measure of 
urbanisation). In the analyses, natural logs of the first and the second set of variables have been 
used. The third set of variables are the proxies for institutional capacity of the recipient countries, 
viz. control of corruption, regulatory quality and political stability. GDP per capita is based on the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) and is reported in constant 2005 US dollars. GDP per capita 
measures the overall levels of economic development in the country. I control for GDP per capita 
and urban population since these are basically linked with democratization of a country and more 
populous countries often receive higher levels of aid (Gibson et al., 2015; World Bank, 2012). We 
expect a positive relation between GDP per capita and improved human development scenarios. 
GDP growth rate is controlled since growth shocks may increase demand for aid and are also likely 
to be associated with demand for political reform (Gibson et al., 2015).  Trade openness measures 
the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. It is expected that 
more openness leads to higher human development. Population growth rate is included as a 
control variable to examine whether aid effectiveness varies by size or population of the countries 
under scrutiny. Higher population growth could mean lower administrative costs that could 
translate to improved human development scenarios of a wider group of the population. Urban 
population (percent of total), a measure of urbanization, should have a positive influence on 
human development indicators, but often this variable provides mixed results. 
 
In recent times, the question of whether quality of governance has any real impact on the effective 
use of aid has become highly crucial. The reason is that, arguably though, aid can be a substitute 
for government expenditures on the social sector. Thus, foreign aid supported by better 
governance might have a positive effect on human development in the recipient countries. This 
view is supported by Burnside and Dollar (2000) as they note that countries with good policies or 
governance may enjoy some positive effects of aid. Many other studies have also incorporated 
policy and governance issues in the analyses. Among them, Pickbourn, and Ndikumana (2013), 
Gopalan and Rajan (2016), Masud and Yontcheva (2005) have examined whether institutional 
governance have any impact on human development by using measures of governance as the 
control variables. Williamson (2008) used Fraser freedom index and the political freedom index to 
control for the institutional environment. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016), Pickbourn, and 
Ndikumana (2013) used government stability, Masud and Yontcheva (2005) used international 
country risk guide (ICRG) and Gopalan and Rajan (2016) have several variables—such as, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, government effectiveness—as the proxies for governance. To 
control for corruption, Okada and Samreth (2012) used the variable ‘control of corruption’. In 
these studies, quality of governance data were sourced from different sources including the 
Freedom House Organization, the Fraser Institute and the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) of the World Bank. 
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Motivated by the general aid-growth literature, therefore, I included three variables to proxy for 
the institutional capacity in recipient countries. ‘Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism’ captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism. This variable controls for political repression, since leaders may sometimes 
use aid supplies as a leverage on political gains by suppressing opposition groups or voters. 
‘Regulatory Quality’ captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests. These variables are important pre-requisites for aid effectiveness, as 
the general expectation is that better quality institutions should enhance human development. 
Thus, we expect all the institutional variables to affect human development positively. To avoid 
multicollinearity problems, I only included the above three quality of governance variables while a 
number of others were also available.  
 
3.6 Data   
The data used in this empirical exercise were collected from two databases of the World Bank’s 
free data portal: World Development Indicators (WDI) and Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI). The study uses data from a sample of 96 countries at various stages of their economic 
development (23 low-income countries, 32 lower middle-income countries and 41 higher middle-
income countries). Country classifications are according to the World Bank. However, the number 
of countries actually used in the analysis varies according to the regressions.  The period of analysis 
covers a total of 19 years and goes from 1996 to 2014. But as governance data for some initial 
years (1997, 1999 and 2001) were not available in the WGI database and there were missing 
observations for key exogenous variables used in the study, the number of observations was 
reduced in regressions. Accordingly, in effect the data period reduces to 16 years only. Thus, the 
sample contains an unbalanced panel data of 96 countries. Details on variable definitions and data 
sources have been summarized in Table 1. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Econometric evidence on aid and human development  
Following the structure of our methodology as mentioned above, therefore, empirical analysis of 
this section has been conducted in two steps. First, as the baseline exercise, the impact of ODA 
on the human development indicators has been assessed using the static fixed effects models 
controlling for several governance quality indicators. Second, robustness checks have been 
undertaken subsequently by estimating the dynamic versions of the baseline model. We also extend 
our analysis to understand if aid effectiveness in human development could plausibly vary across 
low-income and middle-income countries as classified by the World Bank.  
 
4.1.1 Baseline results 
Table 3 presents the results of the baseline fixed effects estimates. The Z vector in model (1) 
includes five macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, population growth 
rate, urbanization, trade openness) and three quality of governance (i.e., the institutional quality) 
variables (‘regulatory quality’, ‘political stability’ and ‘control of corruption’ as the proxies for 
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economic, political and institutional governance respectively). All variables are expressed in natural 
logs excepting the quality of governance variables. As controlling for the level of economic 
development and quality of institutions and governance are highly important, different regression 
specifications are needed. For all dependent variables, therefore, three different regression 
specifications have been presented in columns 1, 2 and 3 to show that the results are convincing. 
In column (1) the results correspond to the complete model with all the control variables 
(macroeconomic and governance). Column (2) reports the corresponding results without the 
institutional quality variables. Finally, column (3) furnishes the corresponding results for ODA 
regressions without controlling for the macroeconomic variables. All models, however, include 
country and year dummies (to eliminate any variation due to country-specific and time-specific 
effects) as additional control variables. Notably, as the data are unbalanced, the number of 
countries we are left with is 85 in the first two columns of each of the dependent variables, whereas 
corresponding number of countries in the third model is 89.  
 
The results provide interesting insights. First, we find significant results for the impact of ODA 
on human development indicators even after controlling for GDP per capita and the governance 
indicators (though this is not true for all of the dependent variables). It is also relevant to note that 
this significant relationship is robust to the choice of different model specifications as shown in 
Table 1. Second, the coefficient for GDP per capita emerges as significant and negative in infant 
mortality regressions suggesting that countries with higher per capita income are likely to have 
lower rate of infant mortality, which is quite intuitive. GDP growth rate emerges as significant and 
positive in infant mortality regressions, suggesting that countries with higher GDP growth rate are 
likely to have higher rate of infant mortality. One plausible explanation of this result might be that 
the benefits of GDP growth is not transmitted to those group of people who are vulnerable to 
infant mortality. Third, among the macro policy variables, we find that trade openness appears to 
be extremely significant across all the regressions and higher trade openness decreases infant 
mortality and death rate and increases life expectancy, suggesting that the more open the country 
is, the higher it is likely to have an improved state of human development as measured by the 
selected indicators. Consistent with the larger literature on aid-growth nexus, population growth 
turns out to be significant in life expectancy and death rate regressions with positive and negative 
signs respectively. With limited geographical size, higher population in a country means increased 
population density. This is indicative of the fact that countries with higher population density tend 
to experience higher life expectancy and lower death rates. Urbanisation is significant in life 
expectancy and death rate regressions with positive and negative signs respectively. Quite 
intuitively, these results suggest that countries with higher urbanisation rate that supposedly ensure 
better health-care facilities tend to experience higher life expectancy and lower death rates. 
   
Three interaction variables, interacted between the institutional quality variables and ODA flows, 
were included in our empirical model. Conventionally, it is expected that sufficient social and 
institutional capacities should be developed in the aid recipient countries so that these countries 
can absorb the aid flows properly and use them in more productive ways. Although most of the 
interaction terms turned out to be insignificant, the positive significant coefficient for the ‘ODA 
× Political Stability’ variable (model 1 of the life expectancy regressions) indicates that higher ODA 
in politically stable aid recipient countries favourably affects human development outcomes in 
terms of life expectancy. Among others, quite expectedly, the coefficients for the ‘control of 
Page 13 of 31 
 
corruption’ variable are negative and significant in infant mortality regressions (model 3) and 
positive and significant in life expectancy regressions (models 1 and 3). Clearly these results indicate 
that better control of corruption (i.e., better institution governance), leads to lower infant mortality 
and higher life expectancy in the sampled countries.   
 
4.1.2 Dynamic results 
In order to ascertain the consistency of the findings of our baseline fixed effects estimates we now 
proceed to perform robustness checks through the dynamic system-GMM estimations of model 
(2). The results essentially are similar. In all model specifications, though the level of statistical 
significance varies, coefficients for the foreign aid variable always exhibit the correct and expected 
signs. Dynamic model estimates of Table 4 show that the coefficients for the lagged dependent 
variable turn out to be extremely significant and they are closer to 1. This provides evidence of 
serial correlation, hence the use of dynamic system-GMM is justified (Gopalan and Rajan, 2016). 
Most variables remain consistent after instrumentation. ODA flows, our aid variable, consistently 
and significantly reduces infant mortality and death rates. Thus, the fundamental relationships of 
interest are intact and correspond to the baseline results obtained previously. Again, although most 
of the interaction terms turned out to be insignificant, the negative significant coefficients for the 
‘ODA × Control of corruption’ variable (model 1 and 3 of infant mortality regressions and model 
1 of the death rate regressions) and the positive significant coefficient of the life expectancy 
regressions (model 3) indicate that better control of corruption in the ODA recipient countries 
favourably affects human development outcomes. Among others, quite expectedly, the 
coefficients for the ‘control of corruption’ variable are negative and significant in infant mortality 
(model 3) regressions and positive and significant in life expectancy regressions (models 1 and 3). 
Clearly these results indicate that better control of corruption leads to lower infant mortality and 
higher life expectancy in the sampled countries. Tests for serial correlation clearly indicate no 
significant evidence of serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at orders 1 and 2. Hansen 
test statistics also confirm that our instruments were correct. So, we may have some confidence 
that the original results were robust to multiple specifications and estimation techniques. 
 
Further, as a further robustness check, the baseline regression was re-run using a conventional 
panel GMM instrumental variables estimation procedure. Choosing convincing instruments tends 
to be tricky. So, we follow the standard practice in the literature in using the lagged version of all 
the control variables including that of aid. Table 5 reports these results. The key variables of 
interest mostly continue to confirm our previous results and also remain statistically significant. 
Even controlling for reverse causality, results confirm that foreign aid significantly affects the 
human development indicators. Development aid positively affects life expectancy and negatively 
affects death rate and both results are statistically significant. Many of the governance control 
variables are statistically insignificant, but coefficients for the regulatory quality, political stability 
and control of corruption variables are statistically significant in the infant mortality regressions 
with expected signs. These suggest that better regulatory quality and control of corruption reduces 
infant mortality. Positive significant coefficients for the political stability variable, however, show 
that infant mortality may remain at a high level even if the country is politically stable. One 
plausible explanation for this result is that political governance may not have any noticeable impact 
on health indicators like infant mortality. The lack of effect of political governance on human 
development measures might be due to inefficiencies in public spending. However, it can also lead 
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to the conclusion that foreign aid might reduce public effort in improving human development. 
The negative significant coefficient for the ‘ODA × Political stability’ interaction variable indicate 
that in aid recipient countries which are politically stable ODA affects infant mortality negatively. 
In the same way,  the positive significant coefficient for the ‘ODA × Control of corruption’ 
interaction variable in life expectancy regression indicate that in aid recipient countries where better 
control of corruption is existing, aid improves life expectancy. Explanations of the statistically 
significant coefficients for the GDP per capita, urbanisation and trade openness variables are 
similar to those provided above.  
 
This core analysis supports my baseline specification, suggesting that foreign aid is effective at 
improving human development measured by the selected health indicators. As these results are 
mostly unperturbed across different models which have been estimated in this exercise, it is logical 
to claim that the results are robust. The results are mostly consistent across different reduced form 
model specifications as well as re-estimations.  
 
4.2 Regional regressions: Is there any difference in outcomes 
The final empirical exercise is to understand whether there is any regional difference in the impacts 
of aid on the human development indicators. That is, whether ODA disbursements affect different 
countries differently? This is an important question, particularly given that the quality of 
governance in different countries could be very different, which consequently might affect the 
effectiveness of aid flows to human development. Tables 6-8 compare the impact of ODA 
disbursements on selected human development indicators in low-income, lower middle-income 
and upper-middle income countries. As our measures of dependent variable, we use infant 
mortality, life expectancy and death rate variables. Panel FE2SLS GMM instrumental variables 
estimates have been presented. Also, we follow the previous regressions in using aid in all its three 
variations of the models.  
 
Interestingly, while comparing the results for infant mortality, we find that aid disbursements have 
a positive and highly statistically significant impact only in the low-income countries as opposed 
to the lower- and upper-middle-income countries. These results indicate that in low-income 
countries, infant mortality rises with higher ODA disbursements. One plausible explanation of 
this might be the fact that in low-income countries factors are than ODA disbursements play an 
important role in determining infant mortality. Like before, we also find GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, population growth, urbanisation and trade openness to be significant in the low-income 
countries regressions. Most of these control variables perform poorly in the middle-income 
regressions, as most of them remain insignificant. Among the individual governance indicators, 
the coefficients for the regulatory quality and control of corruption variables are negative and 
statistically significant in low-income and lower-middle-income country categories, suggesting the 
fact that better regulatory quality and control of corruption lower infant mortality. Like before, 
again, political stability affects infant mortality positively, suggesting that infant mortality rises with 
higher political stability in upper-middle-income countries. Among the interaction variables, infant 
mortality rises as regulatory quality improves in low-income and upper-middle-income countries 
that receive ODA and infant mortality rises as control of corruption improves in the low-income 
countries that receive ODA. However, infant mortality falls as control of corruption improves in 
the upper-middle-income countries that receive ODA. These results are interesting suggesting the 
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fact that quality of governance significantly differs in different countries depending on the income-
levels of those countries.  Tables 7 and 8 provide the corresponding results for life expectancy and 
death rate. We find broadly consistent results as before. As regards the direction and significance 
of the main aid variables, we find positive significant and negative significant results for ODA 
flows to life expectancy and death rate regressions in different country categories. In terms of the 
other control variables, we find remarkable consistency as before in the sense of finding similar 
control variables being significant. Overall, we find interesting results because conventional 
wisdom appears to expect aid effectiveness to be different in different countries depending on 
their income levels.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Being motivated by the changing international perspectives on economic development, this paper 
attempts to empirically explore the micro-level impacts of development aid. Thus, the study 
addresses the issue from the perspective of human development. This is an important of departure 
from earlier studies that aim to assess if foreign aid could help improve GDP growth of the 
recipient countries. The study primarily aims to examine the impact of foreign aid on three selected 
human development indicators—infant mortality, life expectancy at birth and death rate. Estimates 
of the static and dynamic panel data models confirm the robustness of the results. The analysis 
suggests that foreign aid improves countries’ human development indicators measured by infant 
mortality, life expectancy and death rate. This is another point of departure from other studies 
which have used, for instance, human development indices (HDIs) as the dependent variable. The 
paper develops and tests a fixed effects model controlling for potential endogeneity of foreign aid 
and human development. Results in this study are robust to different model specifications, 
estimations methods and data sets. These results suggest that foreign aid is positively and 
significantly linked with, and hence facilitates, human development as expected. So, it seems logical 
that the development community pushes for human development by providing more foreign aid 
as it is a powerful instrument for fighting poverty. Although there are noticeable regional 
differences in terms of the impacts, the study also finds that human development is significantly 
affected by income (measured by GDP per capita), urbanization and trade openness. Also, the 
governance indicators included in the study are found to have impacts on human development.  
 
This study uses ODA as the proxy for development aid. It is not unlikely that other forms of aid—
like NGO aid, bilateral aid or health aid—may give us results with more insights on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in terms of human development in the presence of good policy 
instruments. The positive association between life expectancy and foreign aid may be considered 
as a good point to think how it can be materialized. However, scaling up and allocation of foreign 
have been an extremely complex and gigantic task that requires a rigorous exercise before anything 
is finalized. Also, the study uses data from only one source—the World Bank—while aid data can 
be gathered from other sources including, for example, the OECD-DAC. Future research should 
consider these issues. Also, it is worthwhile to investigate how and to what extent foreign aid, 
particularly ODA flows, is linked with quality of governance and welfare indicators using better 
econometric techniques. 
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Table 1: Variable descriptions and sources of data 
Variable   Description      Source 
Infant mortality  Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)  WDI 
 
Life expectancy  Life expectancy at birth, total (years)   WDI 
 
Death rate   Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people)   WDI 
 
ODA as % of GNI  Net Official Development Assistance    WDI 
(ODA) received (% of GNI) 
 
GDP per capita  GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)   WDI 
 
GDP growth    GDP growth rate (annual %)    WDI 
 
Population growth  Population growth rate (annual %)   WDI  
 
Urbanisation   Urban population (% of total)    WDI 
 
Trade openness  Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) plus WDI 
      Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
 
Regulatory quality  Perceptions of the ability of the government to WDI  
formulate and implement sound policies and  
regulations that permit and promote private  
sector development. 
 
Political stability  Perceptions of the likelihood of political instability WGI  
      and/or politically-motivated violence 
 
Control of corruption  Perceptions of the extent to which public power is WGI  
     exercised for private gain, including both petty and  
     grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of  
     the state by elites and private interests.  
Notes: WDI means World Development Indicators and WGI means World Governance 
Indicators of the World Bank.        
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable            N     Mean     SD        Min         Max 
Infant mortality rate       1,456    45.001     29.732         3.5         152 
Life expectancy at birth 1,456    64.321    9.278     35.659     79.403 
Death rate   1,456     9.249  3.872       3.843      27.616 
ODA percent of GNI  1,398     6.376      10.394             -0.646     181.187 
GDP per capita  1,435    2128.059         2025.65     73.8288     8864.74 
GDP growth rate        1,436     4.966     4.925     -30.145     88.958 
Population growth rate 1,454     1.678      1.173     -2.522     7.989 
Urbanisation    1,456     45.255     19.115        7.412       87.67 
Trade openness  1,407     81.797     38.057    15.636     321.632 
Regulatory quality  1,450    -0.390            0.597    -2.210    1.001 
Political stability  1,449    -0.518     0.778     -2.812    1.186 
Control of corruption  1,452    -0.559     0.506    -1.914    1.25 
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Table 3. Fixed effects (baseline) estimates – impact of ODA disbursements on human development indicators 
    Infant Mortality     Life Expectancy   Death Rate                       
    Model 1       Model 2    Model 3       Model 1      Model 2 Model 3 Model 1       Model 2 Model 3 
ODA per cent of GNI            -0.011         -0.009           -0.005           0.008*         0.006*          0.009*         -0.019          -0.017          -0.027    
                        (0.012)        (0.012)          (0.013)         (0.003)        (0.003)         (0.004)         (0.012)         (0.010)         (0.014)    
GDP per capita             -0.236***    -0.271***                      -0.001          0.006                          0.068            0.047                   
                        (0.064)        (0.062)                        (0.019)        (0.017)                        (0.070)         (0.062)                   
GDP growth               0.010*         0.010*                        -0.000          0.001                         -0.001          -0.002                   
                        (0.004)        (0.004)                        (0.002)        (0.001)                        (0.005)         (0.005)                   
Population growth             -0.023         -0.021                          0.020*         0.021*                        -0.082***     -0.085***                
                        (0.018)        (0.018)                        (0.008)        (0.008)                        (0.022)         (0.023)                   
Urbanisation              -0.096         -0.131                          0.197**        0.215*                        -0.551**      -0.608**                 
                        (0.173)        (0.214)                        (0.063)        (0.085)                        (0.163)         (0.202)                   
Trade openness            -0.144***    -0.145***                       0.023*         0.023*                        -0.073*        -0.069*                  
                        (0.034)        (0.033)                        (0.009)        (0.009)                        (0.033)         (0.032)                   
Regulatory quality        -0.003                               -0.056          -0.008                             -0.005            0.007                              0.043    
                        (0.031)                              (0.034)         (0.012)                            (0.013)         (0.043)                            (0.048)    
ODA × Regulatory quality        0.001                                 0.009         -0.000                              0.002          -0.013                             -0.018    
                        (0.014)                              (0.014)         (0.005)                             (0.005)         (0.018)                            (0.017)    
Political stability           0.004                                 0.007           0.005                               0.007          -0.005                             -0.012    
                        (0.019)                              (0.019)         (0.006)                             (0.006)         (0.021)                            (0.020)    
ODA × Political stability        -0.011                              -0.010           0.007*                              0.007          -0.011                             -0.011    
                        (0.007)                              (0.008)         (0.003)                             (0.004)         (0.010)                            (0.011)    
Control of corruption       -0.066                              -0.087*          0.026*                              0.027*         -0.065                             -0.066    
                        (0.034)                              (0.038)         (0.011)                             (0.013)         (0.040)                             (0.046)    
ODA × Control of corruption -0.007                             -0.016          -0.001                             -0.003           0.010                                0.014    
                        (0.016)                              (0.016)         (0.006)                             (0.006)         (0.020)                             (0.020)    
Constant                 6.014***      6.446***        3.241***      3.368***     3.232***       4.213***       3.874***       4.271***      1.998*** 
                        (0.752)        (0.955)           (0.025)         (0.258)       (0.371)           (0.011)          (0.769)         (0.931)         (0.036)    
R-squared                0.850           0.842             0.824           0.618          0.587             0.548            0.527            0.508           0.379    
N (Groups)                       1147            1150              1368            1147           1150             1368             1147             1150            1368    
Note: All variables are in natural logs excepting the governance quality variables. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4. Dynamic Model Estimates - impact of ODA disbursements on human development indicators 
    Infant mortality     Life expectancy    Death rate 
    Model 1        Model 2       Model 3 Model 1          Model 2     Model 3 Model 1         Model 2         Model 3    
ODA per cent of GNI    -0.018*         -0.005          -0.023            0.004              0.003         0.006          -0.019*         -0.013*         -0.033*   
                       (0.009)         (0.007)         (0.012)         (0.002)            (0.002)       (0.003)         (0.008)         (0.006)         (0.014)    
GDP per capita              0.033            0.050                 -0.008             -0.006          0.015            0.013                   
                       (0.033)         (0.028)                         (0.008)            (0.009)                        (0.013)         (0.015)                   
GDP growth             -0.004          -0.006                            0.001              0.001                          0.000            0.000                   
                       (0.008)         (0.007)                         (0.003)            (0.003)                        (0.005)         (0.003)                   
Population growth           0.001          -0.014                            0.003              0.006                         -0.005          -0.013                   
                       (0.017)         (0.011)                         (0.006)            (0.006)                        (0.011)         (0.013)                   
Urbanisation             -0.007            0.007                            0.002              0.005                         -0.004          -0.012                   
                       (0.052)         (0.053)                         (0.010)            (0.008)                        (0.019)         (0.021)                   
Trade openness            0.025            0.023                          -0.009             -0.007                          0.016            0.013                   
                       (0.021)         (0.019)                         (0.007)            (0.006)                        (0.008)         (0.010)                   
Regulatory quality       -0.012                          -0.024            0.005                              0.008*         -0.012                          -0.011    
                       (0.014)                         (0.022)         (0.003)                           (0.003)         (0.009)                         (0.011)    
ODA × Reg. quality        0.007                            0.008          -0.002                            -0.002           0.007                           0.009    
                       (0.006)                         (0.006)         (0.002)                           (0.002)         (0.004)                         (0.007)    
Pol. Stability        -0.001                            0.008            0.002                            -0.003           0.002                           0.012    
                       (0.009)                         (0.008)         (0.002)                           (0.002)         (0.006)                         (0.008)    
ODA × Pol. Stability       -0.002                          -0.002          -0.000                              0.001          -0.002                          -0.005    
                       (0.004)                         (0.003)         (0.001)                           (0.001)         (0.003)                         (0.004)    
Control of corruption 0.016                            0.029          -0.001                            -0.004           0.013                           0.015    
                       (0.014)                         (0.017)         (0.004)                           (0.004)         (0.014)                         (0.019)    
ODA × C. of corruption -0.016*                         -0.022*           0.004                              0.005*         -0.016**                        -0.024    
  (0.007)                         (0.011)         (0.002)                           (0.003)         (0.006)                         (0.013)    
Low-income econ. 0.077*          0.104*           0.033          -0.031*           -0.037          -0.022**         0.055*           0.062*          0.060*   
                       (0.036)         (0.044)         (0.066)         (0.013)            (0.021)         (0.008)         (0.027)          (0.028)         (0.030)    
Low-mid-income econ. 0.047*          0.059*           0.023          -0.017*           -0.020          -0.013*          0.034*           0.033           0.042*   
                       (0.023)         (0.026)         (0.039)         (0.008)            (0.012)         (0.005)         (0.017)          (0.017)         (0.021)    
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Table 4. Dynamic Model Estimates - impact of ODA disbursements on human development indicators (contd.) 
    Infant Mortality      Life expectancy      Death rate 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2     Model 3 
Lagged infant mortality    1.025***        1.043***        0.999***                                                                                           
                       (0.040)         (0.029)         (0.046)                                                                                              
Lagged life expectancy                                                       0.957***        0.935***        0.908***                                              
                                                                      (0.032)           (0.028)         (0.021)                                                 
Lagged death rate                                                                                                       0.987***        0.975***    0.961*** 
                                                                                                                      (0.024)         (0.016)       (0.027)    
Constant               -0.457          -0.695*         -0.033           0.288*            0.347***       0.398***       -0.168          -0.084         0.053    
                       (0.337)         (0.287)         (0.117)        (0.121)           (0.096)         (0.088)         (0.134)         (0.143)       (0.052)    
Sargan Test    22.62  46.07  6.47  55.80          80.42  7.76  55.40  70.01      23.36 
P-value    0.047  0.000  0.263  0.000          0.000  0.051  0.000  0.000       0.001 
Hansen’s J-test 
P-value    0.187  0.189  0.295  0.909          0.671  0.543  0.679  0.419       0.240 
AR(1) test P-value  0.195  0.211  0.174  0.977          0.876  0.734  0.024  0.030       0.123 
AR(2) test P-value  0.363  0.512  0.239  0.094          0.141  0.189  0.231  0.253       0.274 
Number of instruments  40  40  27  46          40  25  46  40        28 
Lags used   2_3  2_4  2_5  2_4          2_4  2_3  2_4  2_4        2_6 
Observations (Groups)  876 (85)             879 (85)           1036 (89)            876 (85)          879 (85)      1036 (89)            876 (85)             879 (85)    1036 (89)    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5. Impact of ODA disbursements on human development indicator (GMM estimates) 
    Infant mortality     Life expectancy     Death rate 
                      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2     Model 3    
ODA per cent of GNI    -0.022          -0.018          -0.008           0.009*          0.006           0.015***       -0.009          -0.007         -0.032*   
                       (0.017)         (0.014)         (0.015)         (0.004)         (0.003)         (0.004)         (0.015)         (0.012)        (0.015)    
GDP per capita             -0.237***       -0.275***                       -0.008           0.004                           0.089*          0.055                   
                       (0.040)         (0.041)                         (0.011)         (0.010)                         (0.040)         (0.037)                   
GDP growth                0.008*          0.008*                           0.001           0.001                          -0.002          -0.002                   
                       (0.003)         (0.003)                         (0.001)         (0.001)                         (0.004)         (0.004)                   
Population growth           -0.020          -0.025                           0.020***        0.021***                       -0.066***       -0.069***                
                       (0.019)         (0.019)                         (0.005)         (0.005)                         (0.018)         (0.018)                   
Urbanisation              -0.103          -0.143                           0.172***        0.184***                       -0.615***       -0.687***                
                       (0.105)         (0.118)                         (0.027)         (0.026)                         (0.087)         (0.088)                   
Trade openness           -0.035          -0.024                           0.015*          0.013                          -0.045*         -0.034                   
                       (0.019)         (0.020)                         (0.007)         (0.007)                         (0.021)         (0.022)                   
Regulatory quality       -0.028                  -0.066***        0.001                    -0.006          -0.010                          0.046    
                       (0.020)    (0.019)         (0.006)                  (0.006)    (0.024)                                   (0.025)    
ODA × Reg. quality        0.003                           0.003          -0.000                           0.000          -0.020*                             -0.018*   
                       (0.006)                         (0.006)         (0.002)                         (0.003)         (0.009)                                  (0.009)    
Political stability          0.023*                          0.021*         -0.001                           0.001           0.009                                0.005    
                       (0.010)                         (0.009)         (0.003)                         (0.003)         (0.010)                              (0.009)    
ODA × Pol. Stability       -0.013**                        -0.010*          0.002                           0.002           0.001                               -0.001    
                       (0.004)                         (0.004)         (0.001)                         (0.001)         (0.005)                              (0.005)    
Control of corruption     -0.022                          -0.045*          0.004                           0.007          -0.028                               -0.038    
                       (0.024)                         (0.023)         (0.007)                         (0.007)         (0.025)                              (0.026)    
ODA × C. of corrupt. -0.012                          -0.015           0.006                           0.008*         -0.002                               -0.011    
                       (0.011)                         (0.011)         (0.003)                         (0.004)         (0.012)                              (0.013)    
F-statistic  139.16  174.07  180.34  60.60  76.52  51.85  33.18  38.82            23.94         
P-value   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000        0.000  
Hansen’s J-test  0.518  2.812  0.034  0.664  2.028  4.305  0.095  0.433        3.691 
P-value   0.4717  0.0935  0.8541  0.4153  0.1544  0.0380  0.7582  0.5104        0.0547 
Observations (Groups)  787 (83)             788 (83)             932 (88)             787 (83)             788 (83)             932             787 (83)             788 (83)     932 (88)    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6. Regional GMM Model Estimates - impact of ODA disbursements on human development indicators (Dependent variable: Infant mortality) 
    Low-income countries        Lower middle-income countries  Upper middle-income countries 
                   Model 1 Model 2         Model 3      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2          Model 3    
ODA per cent of GNI 0.269**          0.081**         0.313*             -0.010           -0.004          -0.014          -0.003          -0.033           0.001    
                       (0.091)         (0.031)          (0.130)              (0.029)         (0.009)         (0.030)         (0.033)         (0.029)         (0.021)    
GDP per capita             -0.369***       -0.480***                            -0.054           -0.091                          -0.261**        -0.376***                
                       (0.073)         (0.071)                              (0.051)           (0.048)                         (0.087)         (0.075)                   
GDP growth               0.005            0.003                                 0.012*           0.006                           0.016*          0.011                   
                       (0.004)         (0.005)                              (0.006)           (0.005)                         (0.007)         (0.007)                   
Population growth          -0.205***       -0.166***                              0.005            -0.015                          -0.026          -0.029                   
                       (0.040)         (0.037)                               (0.031)          (0.029)                         (0.027)         (0.028)                   
Urbanisation             -0.139          -0.413**                               0.208              0.108                           0.289           0.460                   
                       (0.160)         (0.154)                               (0.124)           (0.107)                         (0.206)         (0.287)                   
Trade openness           -0.001          -0.067*                               -0.006            -0.005                          -0.095          -0.032                   
                       (0.028)         (0.031)                               (0.023)           (0.024)                         (0.074)         (0.078)                   
Regulatory quality       -0.522**                               -0.582**            -0.005                         -0.086*         -0.072                                -0.079*   
                       (0.173)                                (0.194)               (0.029)                        (0.034)         (0.054)                                (0.036)    
ODA × Reg. quality        0.168**                                0.185**            -0.001                         -0.000          -0.005                                    0.008    
                       (0.058)                                (0.063)              (0.011)                        (0.012)         (0.019)                                (0.015)    
Pol. Stability          0.005                                 -0.040               -0.023                          0.006           0.128***                           0.102*** 
                       (0.043)                                (0.051)              (0.012)                                   (0.010)                (0.024)                                         (0.022)    
ODA × Pol. Stability       -0.018                                 -0.002               -0.006                         -0.009           0.015                           0.009    
                       (0.017)                                (0.019)              (0.005)                        (0.005)         (0.011)                         (0.009)    
Control of corruption     -0.292*                                -0.148               -0.047                         -0.054          -0.049                            -0.053    
                       (0.124)                                (0.176)               (0.038)                        (0.044)         (0.040)                         (0.040)    
ODA × C. of corrupt. 0.096*                                  0.005                0.001                           0.003          -0.046*                         -0.048*   
                       (0.047)                                 (0.064)              (0.031)                        (0.035)         (0.020)                         (0.019)    
F-statistic  94.78  114.99          60.76         121.11      126.58  111.92   47.22  48.73  51.05 
P-value   0.000  0.000          0.000         0.000      0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen’s J-test  0.255  0.346          0.043         1.639      3.653  0.459   0.016  0.532  0.008 
P-value   0.6133  0.5565          0.8360         0.2004      0.0560  0.4980   0.8992  0.4660  0.9267  
Observations (Groups)  217 (22)             217 (22)         240 (22)            298 (30)           298 (30)         355 (33)           272 (31)            273 (31)            337 (33)    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 7. Regional GMM Model Estimates - impact of ODA disbursements on human development indicators (Dependent variable: Life expectancy) 
    Low-income countries      Lower middle-income countries        Upper middle-income countries 
    Model 1 Model 2         Model 3        Model 1   Model 2 Model 3       Model 1    Model 2   Model 3    
ODI percent of GNI       -0.028          -0.001              0.068           0.012                 0.002               0.025**         0.012              0.008               0.008    
                       (0.030)         (0.014)            (0.058)     (0.008)               (0.003)             (0.009)          (0.009)           (0.006)           (0.005)    
GDP per capita              0.073**         0.089***               -0.033*               -0.014                                  0.010              0.008                   
                       (0.028)         (0.021)                           (0.015)               (0.015)                               (0.020)            (0.010)                   
GDP growth             -0.001          -0.001                              0.002                 0.002                                  0.001              0.001                   
                       (0.001)         (0.001)                           (0.001)               (0.001)                               (0.002)            (0.002)                   
Population growth          0.060**         0.056**                            0.017*               0.025***                               0.020**          0.021**                 
                       (0.023)         (0.019)                           (0.007)               (0.007)                                (0.007)           (0.007)                   
Urbanisation              -0.110          -0.066                              0.121**             0.160***                               0.158*            0.165*                  
                       (0.058)         (0.054)                           (0.037)               (0.029)                                (0.069)           (0.067)                   
Trade openness             0.015           0.027**                            0.010                 0.007                                  0.014              0.017                   
                       (0.013)         (0.010)                           (0.006)               (0.007)                                (0.019)           (0.017)                   
Regulatory quality        0.085                                   0.022            -0.001                                  -0.010           -0.023                          -0.028*   
                       (0.058)                                (0.086)           (0.008)                                 (0.009)          (0.019)                          (0.011)    
ODA × Reg. quality        -0.029                                 -0.009             0.003                                  -0.001           -0.010                          -0.008*   
                       (0.018)                                (0.028)            (0.004)                                 (0.005)          (0.006)                          (0.004)    
Political stability         -0.019                                 -0.011             0.001                                    0.002              0.004                            0.008    
                       (0.018)                                (0.024)            (0.003)                                 (0.003)           (0.007)                          (0.005)    
ODA × Pol. Stability       0.008                                   0.005             -0.001                                  -0.003            -0.000                             0.000    
                       (0.007)                                (0.009)            (0.002)                                 (0.002)           (0.002)                           (0.002)    
Control of corruption      0.053                                 -0.101              0.001                                  -0.012             0.011                             0.016    
                       (0.035)                                (0.072)            (0.012)                                 (0.014)           (0.010)                           (0.010)    
ODA × C. of corrupt.    -0.014                                   0.044              0.013                                    0.030**          0.011*                            0.012*   
                       (0.012)                                (0.024)            (0.010)                                 (0.010)           (0.005)                           (0.005)    
F-statistic  51.40  56.36          34.95      32.54     37.78     33.78          12.99      17.10    17.32 
P-value   0.000  0.000          0.000      0.000     0.000     0.000          0.000      0.000    0.000 
Hansen’s J-test  0.019  0.033          0.041      0.561     1.025     3.481          0.079      0.163    0.011 
P-value   0.8891  0.8557          0.8401      0.4538     0.3113  0.0621          0.7786      0.6862    0.9161 
Observations (Groups)  217 (22)             217 (22)         240 (22)         298 (30)     298 (30)          355 (33)        272 (31)          273 (31)           337 (33)    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8. Regional GMM Model Estimates - impact of ODA disbursements on human development indicators (Dependent variable: Death rate) 
    Low-income countries    Lower middle-income countries       Upper middle-income countries 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3      Model 1   Model 2           Model 3    
ODA percent of GNI     0.073          -0.009          -0.072          -0.026          -0.003          -0.081*        -0.004             -0.004             -0.009    
                       (0.075)         (0.033)         (0.104)         (0.028)         (0.010)         (0.032)         (0.032)            (0.023)            (0.019)    
GDP per capita             -0.159*         -0.196***              0.185**         0.097                                 0.034              0.015                   
                       (0.069)         (0.054)                         (0.062)         (0.057)                              (0.077)            (0.049)                   
GDP growth              0.001           0.003                          -0.006          -0.008                                 0.001             -0.001                   
                       (0.003)         (0.004)                         (0.005)         (0.005)                              (0.007)            (0.006)                   
Population growth          -0.171***       -0.154***                       -0.062*         -0.078**                                -0.066*          -0.070*                  
                       (0.050)         (0.039)                         (0.027)         (0.025)                              (0.027)            (0.028)                   
Urbanisation               0.047          -0.113                          -0.404***       -0.435***                               -0.183            -0.179                   
                       (0.141)         (0.133)                         (0.110)         (0.076)                              (0.289)            (0.289)                   
Trade openness            0.005          -0.027                          -0.031          -0.026                               -0.085            -0.079                   
                       (0.030)         (0.022)                         (0.021)         (0.024)                              (0.071)           (0.064)                   
Regulatory quality       -0.267                          -0.140           0.040                           0.085*          0.031                            0.125**  
                       (0.151)                         (0.164)         (0.030)                         (0.034)         (0.067)                          (0.043)    
ODA × Reg. quality        0.082                            0.041          -0.041**                        -0.021           0.009            0.023    
                       (0.047)                         (0.052)         (0.015)                         (0.018)         (0.023)                          (0.015)    
Political stability          0.089                            0.063          -0.009                          -0.007           0.006                           -0.012    
                       (0.045)                         (0.048)         (0.009)                         (0.009)         (0.027)                          (0.023)    
ODA × Pol. Stability       -0.026                          -0.018           0.004                           0.010            0.008                            0.009    
                       (0.017)                         (0.019)         (0.006)                         (0.007)         (0.008)                          (0.007)    
Control of corruption  -0.172                            0.082          -0.006                           0.053           -0.048                           -0.070    
                       (0.090)                         (0.125)         (0.038)                         (0.045)         (0.038)                          (0.036)    
ODA × C. of corrupt.     0.045                          -0.059          -0.013                          -0.083*        -0.022                           -0.038*   
                       (0.031)                         (0.041)         (0.032)                         (0.035)         (0.019)                          (0.019)    
F-statistic  67.06  61.22   64.49  17.78  22.93  13.50        1.80    2.16       1.98 
P-value   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000        0.0183    0.0071    0.0127 
Hansen’s J-test  0.002  0.157   0.000  0.024  0.128  2.335        0.022    0.014                 0.022 
P-value   0.9681  0.6923   0.9899  0.8780  0.7201  0.1265        0.8825    0.9070    0.8817 
Observations (Groups)  217 (22)  217 (22)          240 (22)          298 (30)          298 (30)          355 (33)        272 (31)        273 (31)              337 (33)    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.1: List of Countries in the Sample 
Low-Income Economies Lower-Middle-Income 
Economies 
Upper-Middle-Income 
Economies 
Afghanistan 
Benin  
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Chad 
Ethiopia 
Gambia, The 
Guinea 
Haiti 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali  
Mozambique 
Nepal  
Niger 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
(23) 
Armenia 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Georgia 
Ghana  
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Lao PDR 
Lesotho 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria  
Pakistan  
Papua New 
Guinea   
Philippines 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Tajikistan 
Ukraine  
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Zambia 
(32) 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina* 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
Botswana  
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile* 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Grenada 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan  
Lebanon 
Lithuania* 
Malaysia  
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Namibia 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru    
Romania  
South Africa 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uruguay* 
Venezuela, 
RB*  
(41) 
 
 
 
 
 
